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Understanding cross-country differences in exporter premia:
comparable evidence for 14 countries
Abstract
We use comparable micro level panel data for 14 countries and a set of identically specified empirical
models to investigate the relationship between exports and productivity. Our overall results are in line
with the big picture that is by now familiar from the literature: exporters are more productive than
non-exporters when observed and unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, and these exporter
productivity premia tend to increase with the share of exports in total sales; there is evidence in favour
of self-selection of more productive firms into export markets, but nearly no evidence in favour of the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis. We document that the exporter premia differ considerably across
countries in identically specified empirical models. In a meta-analysis of our results we find,
consistently with theoretical predictions, that productivity premia are larger in countries with lower
export participation rates, with more restrictive trade policies, lower per capita GDP, less effective
government and worse regulatory quality, and in countries exporting to relatively more distant markets.
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Abstract:  
We use comparable micro level panel data for 14 countries and a set of identically 
specified empirical models to investigate the relationship between exports and 
productivity. Our overall results are in line with the big picture that is by now familiar 
from the literature: exporters are more productive than non-exporters when observed 
and unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, and these exporter productivity 
premia tend to increase with the share of exports in total sales; there is evidence in 
favour of self-selection of more productive firms into export markets, but nearly no 
evidence in favour of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. We document that the 
exporter premia differ considerably across countries in identically specified empirical 
models. In a meta-analysis of our results we find, consistently with theoretical 
predictions, that productivity premia are larger in countries with lower export 
participation rates, with more restrictive trade policies, lower per capita GDP, less 
effective government and worse regulatory quality, and in countries exporting to 
relatively more distant markets. 
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1. Motivation 
In 1995 Bernard and Jensen published the first of series of papers that use large 
comprehensive longitudinal data from surveys performed regularly by official 
statistics in the United States to look at differences between exporters and non-
exporters in various dimensions of firm performance, including productivity (see 
Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1999, 2004a). These papers started a new strand of 
economic literature, as researchers all over the world began to use the rich data sets 
collected by the statistical offices to study the export activity of firms, its causes, and 
its consequences. The extent and causes of productivity differentials between 
exporters and their counterparts which sell on the domestic market only is one of the 
core topics addressed. 
In this literature two alternative but not mutually exclusive hypotheses about 
why exporters can be expected to be more productive than non-exporting firms are 
discussed and investigated empirically (see Bernard and Jensen 1999; Bernard and 
Wagner 1997): The first hypothesis points to self-selection of the more productive 
firms into export markets. The reason for this is that there exist additional costs of 
selling goods in foreign countries. The range of extra costs include transportation 
costs, distribution or marketing costs, personnel with skills to manage foreign 
networks, or production costs in modifying current domestic products for foreign 
consumption. These costs provide an entry barrier that less productive firms cannot 
overcome. Furthermore, the behaviour of firms might be forward-looking in the sense 
that the desire to export tomorrow may lead a firm to improve performance today to 
be competitive in the foreign market. Cross-section differences between exporters 
and non-exporters, therefore, may in part be explained by ex-ante differences 
between firms: The more productive firms become exporters. The second hypothesis 
points to the role of post-entry effects of exports on productivity. Knowledge flows 
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from international buyers and competitors help to improve the post-entry 
performance of export starters. Furthermore, firms participating in international 
markets are exposed to more intense competition and must improve faster than firms 
who sell their products domestically only. Thus, exporting can make firms more 
productive. 
Summarizing the results from a comprehensive survey of the empirical 
literature that covers 45 studies with data from 33 countries published between 1995 
and 2006 Wagner (2007) argues that, details aside, the big picture that emerges after 
some ten years of micro-econometric research in the relationship between exporting 
and productivity is that exporters are more productive than non-exporters, and that 
the more productive firms self-select into export markets, while exporting does not 
necessarily improve productivity.1 However, this big picture hides a lot of 
heterogeneity. Cross-country comparisons, and even cross-study comparisons for 
one country, are difficult because the studies differ in details of the approach used. 
Therefore, the jury is still out on many of the issues regarding the relationship 
between exporting and productivity, including the absolute size of the productivity 
advantage needed to clear the export market hurdle and the reasons for differences 
in this size between countries, the reasons for the existence or not of ex-post effects 
in some countries, the determinants of ex-ante productivity premia of export starters, 
and the mechanisms by which learning from exporting occurs. 
This paper contributes to filling this gap, by performing an international 
comparison, using the same methodology on similar datasets to assess the 
association between firms’ productivity and exporting. Bringing together researchers 
having access to firm (or establishment) level data from 14 different countries (11 EU 
                                                          
1 For contemporaneous but less comprehensive surveys of this literature with a partly different focus 
see López (2005) and Greenaway and Kneller (2007). 
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countries, plus Chile, Colombia from Latina America and China from Asia) we were 
able to define a common empirical methodology and each team could run the same 
routine on their dataset. This allowed to perform a rather robust estimation (e.g. 
controlling for individual fixed effects or, alternatively, sector (4-digit) and time 
dummies, as well as firm/plant size and human capital) and achieve a rather high 
degree of comparability of results across a large number of countries. In our view, 
this makes this analysis a rather unique piece of work, which nicely complements 
other recent comparative works on export and productivity. On the one hand, we 
apply a methodology very similar to Hallward-Driemeier, Iarossi and Sokoloff (2002), 
which compare productivity premia across 5 East Asian countries, but our analysis 
spans a larger number of countries, none of which was included in Hallward-
Driemeier et al. (2002). On the other hand, our work is complementary to a recent 
Bruegel report on firm heterogeneity and international activities in Europe (Mayer and 
Ottaviano, 2007, henceforth MO). In fact, similarly to MO, our paper focuses mainly, 
although not exclusively, on EU countries. However, while the MO addresses several 
issues, such as the concentration of exporting activities, export and FDI’s premia, as 
well as intensive and extensive margins, our paper primarily focuses on the export 
and productivity link. The narrower focus allows us to use more robust estimation 
methods and achieve greater international comparability2. The main result of our 
analysis is that exporters are indeed more productive than non-exporting firms, and 
this appears to be mainly due to the self-selection of more productive firms into 
export, while we find robust evidence for ex-post effects of export on productivity only 
for one out of 14 countries. These results are in line with those reported for the US by 
Bernard and Jensen (2004b) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007), 
                                                          
2 For example, MO address the productivity premia of exporters only for French firms, and report only 
unconditional differences in productivity, without controlling for individual fixed effects, nor even sector 
and size effects. 
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henceforth BJRS, and many other country studies reviewed in Wagner (2007). 
However, we find that this premium varies a lot across countries. Exploiting the large 
number of countries and the high degree of comparability of our results, we are in a 
privileged position to perform a meta-analysis to explain such a variation in cross-
country productivity premia of exporters. Building on gravity models of international 
trade, as well as on recent theories of trade with heterogeneous firms, we provide a 
framework to select a set of country characteristics which help explaining the cross-
country variation on exporter premia. Consistently with theoretical predictions, we 
find that productivity premia are larger in countries with lower export participation 
rates, with more restrictive trade policies, lower per capita GDP, less effective 
government and worse regulatory quality, and in countries exporting to relatively 
more distant markets,       
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides information 
on the countries included, the data used, and descriptive statistics on some export 
characteristics. Section 3 reports the so-called exporter productivity premia, defined 
as the ceteris paribus percentage difference of productivity (measured as sales per 
worker) between exporters and non-exporters. Section 4 investigates ex-ante and ex-
post productivity differences between exporters and non-exporters. Section 5 reports 
some robustness checks, including the estimation of exporter premia using, for a 
lower number of countries, different measures of productivity (such as value added 
per worker and TFP), and samples comprising also smaller firms (10-19 employees). 
Section 6 performs a meta-analysis aimed at exploring the factors behind country 
differences in exporters’ premia. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Countries, data sets, and descriptive evidence on exporter characteristics 
A list of the 14 countries involved in this international comparison study, and some 
information on the data sets used, are given in Table 1. While most of the countries 
come from the European Union, Chile and Colombia from South America and China 
from Asia are included, too.3  
[Table 1 near here]  
The data are either at the level of the establishment (the plant, the local 
production unit) or at the level of the firm (the legal unit). Unfortunately, it was neither 
possible to aggregate all establishment level data to the firm level, nor was it possible 
to split up firm level information to the establishment level. This different level of 
aggregation is one dimension in which the results reported in this study are not truly 
comparable across all countries. The other dimension is due to the different years 
covered. If we had limited the data used to years that are covered in all data sets, we 
would have ended up with a reduced set of countries and a small number of years. 
Therefore, we decided to use all the information at hand, and to control for the 
different years covered in the estimation of the empirical models. Additionally, our 
analysis controls for both time periods and the unit of analysis when estimating 
specific relationships between exporter characteristics and firm/country variables.  
Some of the data sets cover units with at least 20 employees, some with at 
least 10 employees, and some have information on all units. Results reported in this 
paper are for units with at least 20 employees; for those countries whose data sets 
cover units with at least 10 employees, comparable results are reported as 
robustness checks in section 5. Furthermore, all computations are limited to units 
                                                          
3 The composition of the sample of countries included is the result of a call for participation sent out by 
Joachim Wagner early in 2005 to all authors of studies covered in Wagner (2007). Unfortunately, not 
all of them agreed to participate, but, fortunately, others joined later when they heard of the project. 
Researchers from countries not yet represented in the group are cordially invited to join – please 
contact Joachim Wagner by mailing to wagner@uni-lueneburg.de. 
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from manufacturing industries with NACE 2 letters code DA to DN (or ISIC code 15 to 
36). 
The exporter participation rate (defined as the percentage of exporting firms), 
the export intensity rate (defined as the average share of exports in total sales for 
exporting firms) and the contribution of different groups of exporters to aggregate 
exports in the 14 countries4, are reported for the last year covered in the data set in 
Table 2. 
[Table 2 near here] 
Table 2 documents that both the exporter participation rate and the export 
intensity differ widely across the countries covered in this study. According to the 
information reported the average share of sampled firms with at least 20 employees 
that export is 64 percent5. Across countries the participation rate ranges from 26.6 
percent for Colombia to 83 percent for Sweden. Furthermore, the share of firms with 
at least 20 employees that export within each industry ranges rather widely: the 
average rate is 79.7 percent of Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and 
man-made fibres, while the average is 46.6 percent for Manufacture of food products, 
beverage and tobacco. For those countries whose data sets cover units with at least 
10 employees, the average export participation is 54 percent, with individual rates 
ranging from 18.2 percent for Colombia to 74.6 percent for Belgium. This reduction of 
10 percentage points suggests that the probability of being exporter is negatively 
associated with the size of the firm (see ISGEP, 2007).  
Comparing the previous figures with two recent papers that offer evidence on 
exporter participation, our rates are roughly in line with those reported by MO (2007) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
4 Given that there are still large differences between West Germany and the former communist East 
Germany, results are reported for both parts of Germany individually. 
5 From now on we will use the term ‘firm’ to refer to the unit of analysis irrespective of whether the data 
are collected at the establishment or the enterprise level. 
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for a group of European countries. However, the second paper by BJRS (2007) 
reports an 18 percent participation rate for U.S. manufacturing firms in year 2002. 
BJRS (2007) interprets the rather small participation rate of U.S. manufacturing firms 
as evidence that exporting is a rare firm activity. This discrepancy might be related to 
the fact that BJRS (2007) uses data from the Census of Manufacturers, which is an 
exhaustive data set, while our study and MO (2007) use surveys of units with at least 
10 or 20 employees. As the probability of being exporter is strongly and positively 
affected by the size of the firm, the use of restricted or/and exhaustive samples might 
explain the observed differences. Furthermore, the size of the internal country is a 
factor that influences the participation rate, i. e. the higher is the size, the lower the 
participation rate. This characteristic might be an additional factor explaining the 
lower participation rate of the U.S. compared to our and MO (2007) estimates. 
Export intensity is measured as the share of exports on total sales per firm 
conditional on exporting. According to values reported in Table 2, the average export 
intensity across countries is 37 percent with individual intensities ranging from 17.8 
percent for Colombia to 60.3 percent for China. BJRS (2007) reports an US average 
export intensity of 14 percent across all firms that export. The paper of MO (2007) 
does not report information on this characteristic of exporters.   
 A third characteristic reported in Table 2 refers to the contributions to 
aggregate exports of exporters occupying the top positions (one, five and 10 percent) 
in the ranking of exporting firms. Evidence reported by BJRS (2007) and MO (2007) 
suggest that aggregate exports are driven by a reduced number of top exporters. In 
particular, MO (2007) shows, for a group of European countries, that the top one 
percent, five percent and 10 percent of top exporters account for no less than 40 
percent, 70 percent and 80 percent of aggregate exports. Estimates reported in 
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Table 2 confirm this strong concentration of international trade across firms for the 
group of 14 countries. 
 Next, we identify some stylized facts about export participation and export 
intensity using a simple regression analysis. The objective is to explore the 
relationship between export activity at the firm-level and some basic firm and country 
characteristics. In particular, the size of the firm and two country characteristics, the 
size of the domestic market and the level of per-capita income, as a proxy for the 
degree of development, are the main characteristics we want to focus on.  To be 
more specific, we estimate an equation of the form: 
β ε⎛ ⎞ = +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
ln
1
j
j j
j
p
X
p
 
Where the dependent variable is the export participation (export intensity) of country 
j, defined over four size groups of firms (20-49; 50-249; 250-499 and +500) in the 
initial and the final year of sample period for each country. The logit transformation of 
the dependent variable is introduced to deal with the fact that the dependent 
variables are proportions with values between 0 and 1. Xj is a vector of control 
variables relating to firm size classes and country characteristics. Two additional 
controls are included, the first is a dummy set equal to one for the end-of-sample 
observations of each country, the objective is to measure whether export 
participation (export intensity) varies over time. The second is a dummy variable set 
equal to one if the observation belongs to a survey carried out at the establishment 
level. Results are provided in Table 3.   
[Table 3 near here] 
Concerning size effects, both export participation and export intensity are 
positively associated with the size of the firm. However, in the relationship between 
export intensity and size there is a flat area, as the pairwise comparison of the 
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coefficients for the dummy variables for firms with 50-249 and 250-499 are 
statistically equal. These results indicate that the probability of participating in export 
markets for a firm is greater the larger is its size and the intensity of their activity, 
defined as the share of export in total sales, generally increases with firm size.  
 Concerning country characteristics, both the size and the degree of economic 
development have a significant impact on firm’s export activity. The size of the 
domestic market, proxied by country’s GDP, significantly reduces the share of firms 
participating in export markets. Simultaneously, the level of development, proxied by 
the GDP per capita, influences positively export participation in export markets. Both 
variables, the level of GDP and GDP per capita, have a similar impact on export 
intensity: the size of the domestic market reduces export intensity and the degree of 
development increases export intensity. In the estimates of the second column the 
introduction of a dummy for China is required for the coefficients attached to GDP 
and GDP per capita to be statistically significant. China is an outlier with the highest 
level of export intensity across exporting firms.  
Finally, we have to mention that the use of establishment surveys in a given 
country tends to overestimate export participation relative to other countries using 
firm surveys. The opposite is true with respect to export intensity. No systematic 
pattern is observed with respect to the evolution of export participation and export 
intensity over the period. 
 
3. Empirical results I: Exporter productivity premia  
To investigate differences in productivity between exporters and non-exporters we 
start with the computation of the so-called exporter productivity premia, defined as 
the ceteris paribus percentage difference of productivity between exporters and non-
exporters. Productivity is measured in a number of different ways in the literature, 
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including labour productivity (defined as sales, or value added, per employee, or per 
hour worked) and several variants of total factor productivity. Given that information 
on value added, hours worked, and the capital stock used in the firm is available for 
some of the countries included in this international comparison project only, we have 
to rely on the simplest measure of productivity, i.e. sales per employee (measured in 
constant prices). This decision has pros and cons. On the one hand, value added is 
not necessarily a better basis to measure productivity than sales, turnover or gross 
output. The reason is that value added does not track production in a year as closely 
as gross output or turnover would do (cf. Oulton and O’Mahony, 1994, pp. 25ff). 
Furthermore, Bartelsman and Doms (2000, p. 575) point to the fact that 
heterogeneity in labour productivity has been found to be accompanied by similar 
heterogeneity in total factor productivity; and Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson 
(2005) show that productivity measures that are based on sales (i.e., quantities 
multiplied by prices) and measures that are based on quantities only are highly 
positively correlated. On the other hand, there is a concern about the association 
between the level of productivity (as measured by sales per employee) and different 
degrees of vertical integration at the firm level. Recent papers estimating exporter 
productivity as BJRS (2007) and MO (2007) use value added per worker and TFP as 
the preferred choice. We present results in this section using sales per employee as 
the measure of productivity and various robustness checks using value added per 
employee and TFP for some countries that will be presented in Section 5 below.  
The exporter labour productivity premia are computed from a regression of log 
labour productivity on the current export status dummy and a set of control variables 
(1) ln LPit = a + ß Exportit + c Controlit + eit 
where i is the index of the firm, t is the index of the year, LP is labour productivity, 
Export is a dummy variable for current export status (1 if the firm exports in year t, 0 
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else), Control is a vector of control variables that includes the log of number of 
employees and its squared value to measure firm size, the log of wages and salaries 
per employee (in constant prices) to proxy for human capital, and a full set of 
interaction terms of 4-digit industry-dummies6 and year dummies to control for 
industry-specific differences in capital intensity and shocks, and e is an error term. 
The exporter productivity premium, computed from the estimated coefficient ß as 
100*(exp(ß)-1), shows the average percentage difference in labour productivity 
between exporters and non-exporters controlling for the characteristics included in 
the vector Control. To control for unobserved plant heterogeneity due to time-
invariant firm characteristics which might be correlated with the variables included in 
the empirical model and which might lead to a biased estimate of the exporter 
productivity premia, a variant of (1) is estimated including fixed firm effects, also. 
Results for the estimated exporter productivity premia from empirical models 
with and without fixed firm effects for each of the 14 countries are reported in Table 4 
for samples covering all firms with more than 20 employees.7 
[Table 4 near here] 
Looking at the results for all firms we find that the estimated premia are always 
statistically significantly different from zero, and often rather large, for pooled data. If 
fixed firm effects are added to control for unobserved heterogeneity the estimated 
premia are still statistically significant in all countries but Sweden,8 but the point 
                                                          
6 3-digit industry-dummies had to be used in the case of Italy and Spain. 
7 To control for the effects of extreme observations that are often found in these data from official 
statistics due to reporting errors or idiosyncratic events, the firms with the bottom / top one percent 
labour productivity in a year are excluded from all computations for this and all following Tables in this 
study. 
8 There is no definite reason for the insignificance of the productivity premia in the Swedish case. One 
plausible explanation is that Sweden has a limited domestic market and entry costs to the neighboring 
countries (Denmark, Norway and Finland) are supposedly low (cf. Andersson 2007). Another is that 
many Swedish firms belong to multinational corporations with established trading networks to foreign 
countries. Andersson, Johansson and Lööf (2007) show that about 35 % of Swedish manufacturing 
firms belong to MNEs and that MNEs are responsible for over 90 % of the total value of Sweden’s 
exports.   
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estimates are much smaller compared to the results based on pooled data only. 
Unobserved firm heterogeneity does matter.  
The average exporter premia for the 14 countries, after controlling for 
individual fixed effects, is 7 percent. The average premia without controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity is 22.4 percent. Therefore the reduction in exporter premia 
after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is substantial. BJRS (2007) reports for 
US manufacturing an exporter premia, defined as value added per worker, of 29.7 
percent, which reduces to 10.5 percent after controlling for industry and size effects 
(no control for firm unobserved  heterogeneity is considered). MO (2007) reports only 
premia for French exporters of 31 percent for value added per worker and without 
controls. 
Taking as reference the results from the model including fixed effects, Table 4 
gives new insights on the relative magnitude of the export premia across countries. 
For a large majority of countries (6 over the 13 for which export premia are found 
statistically significant), the premia lie in a range of 6.6 to 8.1 percent. Two subgroups 
of countries emerge however which display relatively high and relatively low export 
premia. The first subgroup includes Colombia (16.4 percent), China (10.9 percent) 
and Belgium (9.8 percent) while the second subgroup includes Austria (5.3 percent), 
UK (3.9 percent), Italy (3.6 percent), Slovenia (5 percent), and East Germany (5.6 
percent).  
To investigate how the premia vary with export intensity, a modified version of 
the empirical model (1) is used where the dummy variable indicating the export 
status is replaced by the share of exports in total sales and its squared value. The 
results are reported in Table 5.  
[Table 5 near here] 
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Given that the results differ considerably when fixed firm effects are added to 
the model estimated with pooled data, we again focus on the results from the 
empirical model controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. From the results 
reported in Table 5 for all firms we conclude that the share of exports in total sales 
matters for the size of the exporter productivity premia in all countries but Slovenia9 
because at least one of the two estimated coefficients (for the share of exports in 
total sales, and for its squared value) is statistically different from zero at the five 
percent level. Looking at the pattern of the signs of the estimated coefficients, and 
focusing on point estimates that are statistically different from zero at the five percent 
level, we find that the exporter productivity premium varies with the share of exports 
in total sales as follows: 
- it increases (either both estimated coefficients have a positive sign, or the 
coefficient with a negative sign is statistically insignificant) in Austria, West Germany, 
East Germany, Italy, Republic of Ireland, and the UK;10  
- it increases at a decreasing rate (the coefficient of the share of exports in 
total sales is positive, the coefficient of the squared value is negative, and the 
estimated maximum is reached for a value of the share of exports that is either 
higher than 100 percent, or very high compared to the average share of exports in 
total sales of the exporting firms according to Table 2) in Belgium, Chile, Colombia, 
Denmark, France, and Spain;  
- it increases, reaches a maximum at around 50 percent, and decreases 
afterwards in China; and 
                                                          
9 This is in line with findings from other studies using Slovenian firm data; for a discussion see 
Damijan, Polanec and Prasnicar (2004) and Damijan and Kostevc (2006). 
10 In the UK data the sign pattern is “- / +”, but the estimated minimum of the parabola is 8.3 percent, 
so this indicates that the exporter premium is increasing in the share of exports in total sales in 
general. 
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- it decreases (the positive coefficient of the squared term is statistically 
insignificant) in Sweden. 
 
4. Empirical results II: Ex-ante and ex-post exporter productivity premia  
The empirical results reported and discussed in Section 3 relate to the correlation 
between labour productivity and exports. Regarding the direction of causality 
between these two dimensions of firm performance, there are two not mutually 
exclusive hypotheses mentioned in the introduction. To shed light on the empirical 
validity of the first hypothesis – namely, that the more productive firms sell abroad – 
the pre-entry differences in labour productivity between export starters and non-
exporters are investigated next. If good firms become exporters then we should 
expect to find significant differences in performance measures between future export 
starters and future non-starters several years before some of them begin to export. 
To test whether today’s export starters were more productive than today’s non-
exporters several years back when all of them did not export, all firms that did not 
export between year t-3 and t-1 are selected, and the average difference in labour 
productivity in year t-3 between those firms who did export in year t and those who 
did not is computed. More formally, we estimate the following empirical model for 
each cohort of export starters and non-starters: 
(2) ln LPit-3 = a + ß Exportit + c Controlit-3 + eit 
where i is the index of the firm, t is the index of the year, LP is labour productivity in 
year t-3, Export is a dummy variable for current export status (1 if the firm exports in 
year t, 0 else), Control is a vector of control variables that includes the log of the 
number of employees and its squared value to measure firm size, the log of wages 
and salaries per employee (in constant prices) to proxy human capital, and a set of 4-
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digit industry-dummies11 to control for industry-specific differences in capital intensity 
and industry specific shocks, and e is an error term. The pre-entry premium, 
computed from the estimated coefficient ß as 100*(exp(ß)-1), shows the average 
percentage difference between today’s exporters and today’s non-exporters three 
years before starting to export, controlling for the characteristics included in the 
vector Control.  
[Table 6 near here] 
Results are reported in Table 6. As can be seen from column [1], the number 
of export starters in the data sets used is often rather small. Therefore, it comes as 
no surprise that for some countries (Austria, Belgium, the Republic of Ireland, 
Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK) the point estimates for the ex-ante labour productivity 
premia of export starters is nearly always statistically insignificant. However, when 
the estimated ex-ante premia in these countries is statistically different from zero, it is 
positive. Ex-ante productivity differences are usually in the expected direction but 
rather small. Further, for Chile, China and Colombia (the three less developed 
countries covered in our study) 65 percent of the cohorts of starters in the three 
countries has been compared have an ex-ante productivity premia that is statistically 
significant at 10 percent or lower. For the group that includes France, Italy, West 
Germany (these three with a large cohort of export starters in their samples) and 
Spain, 72 percent of the cohorts of starters in the four countries has ex-ante a 
productivity premia that is statistically significant at 10 percent or lower.12 To 
summarize, we find evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis for the less 
developed countries in our sample and for EU-countries with suitable data sets 
                                                          
11 3-digit industry-dummies had to be used in the case of Italy and Spain. 
12 Countries in both groups (less and more developed) for which the data sets allow doing the analysis 
by including firms with more than 10 employees instead of only with more than 20, the results about 
the ex-ante export productivity premia are even reinforced, both in terms of the number of years where 
the effect is significant and the positive magnitute of the effect, that increases (see ISGEP, 2007) 
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including a large enough number of export starters to investigate this issue. Overall, 
in 42 cohorts out of a total number of 99 cohorts that have been compared, pre-entry 
productivity premia is as expected and statistically significant. If we restrict the 
comparison to the group of countries with cohorts of export starters including a large 
enough number of firms, the percentage of cases with a statistically significant 
difference rises up to a 69 percent.   
To test the second hypothesis mentioned in the introduction – namely, that 
exporting fosters productivity - the post-entry differences in productivity growth 
between export starters and non-exporters are investigated. This test is based on a 
comparison of firms that did not export in years t-3 to t-1, but that exported in year t 
and in at least two years between the years t+1 and t+3 – these are the export 
starters – with firms from a control group that did not export in any year between t-3 
and t+3. The empirical model used is 
(3) ln LPit+3 - ln LPit+1 = a + ß Exportit + c Controlit + eit 
where i is the index of the firm, t is the index of the year, LP is labour productivity, 
Export is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for export starters and the value 
zero for the firms from the control group, Control is a vector of control variables that 
includes the log of number of employees and its squared value to measure firm size, 
the log of wages and salaries per employee (in constant prices) to proxy human 
capital, and a set of 4-digit industry-dummies13 to control for industry-specific 
differences in capital intensity and industry specific shocks, and e is an error term. 
The post-entry premium, computed from the estimated coefficient ß as 100*(exp(ß)-
1), shows the average percentage difference in the growth of labour productivity 
between the export starters and non-exporters over the three years after the start, 
controlling for the characteristics included in the vector Control.  
                                                          
13 3-digit industry-dummies had to be used in the case of Italy and Spain. 
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[Table 7 near here]  
A summary of the results is reported in Table 7. Again, the number of export starters 
that can be monitored with the data sets available for this study are too small for 
most countries to offer a solid basis for the empirical comparison. Overall, the results 
are mixed, with positive and negative statistically significant estimates for some years 
in some countries. For the less developed countries in our sample (Chile, China and 
Colombia), for whom we found evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis, we 
only get significant coefficients for China but with a negative ex-post export 
productivity growth premia. Looking at the results for France, West Germany, and 
Italy, where the number of starters seems to be large enough for our purpose and for 
whom we also found evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis, we find 
evidence in favour of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis for Italy only. For the 
remaining countries we do not find a clear statistically significant pattern. Therefore, 
we can conclude from our study, and similarly to MO (2007) who did the analysis of 
the learning by exporting hypothesis only for France, Norway and Germany, that 
“there is no clear evidence of firms performing differently after accessing foreign 
markets”. Overall, only in 8 cohorts out of a total number of 56 cohorts (14 percent) 
that have been compared, post-entry productivity growth indicates that entering 
exporters perform better than non-exporters.14 
 
5. Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our results we repeat our empirical analysis with different 
measures of productivity, and with firms having at least 10 employees included in the 
                                                          
14 Results do not perceptibly change for the countries where we could perform the analysis using firms 
with more than 10 employees. Applying our definition of export starter to these wider samples does 
only incorporate a few more export starters from the size class of 10 to 20 employees (see ISGEP, 
2007). 
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samples, for the countries where the data needed are available to us. 
As a first robustness check, we repeat the calculations in Table 4 using two 
different dependent variables. Subtracting intermediate inputs (which include raw 
materials and energy where possible) from total sales, we construct value added and 
divide it by employment as before to obtain a more customary measure of labour 
productivity (VA/L). Subtracting (1-sj)* ln (K/L) from value added per worker, where sj 
is the wage share in value added for industry j, we obtain an estimate of total factor 
productivity (TFP) which is our third dependent variable.  
In Table 8 we report results for these two new dependent variables. For data 
availability reasons, the results can be obtained only for a subset of the countries. As 
the sample size is often reduced due to missing value added or capital information, 
we report results using all three dependent variables on the same sub-sample for 
which we observe TFP. As before, we drop the 1% outliers at the top and bottom of 
the productivity distributions. The reported statistics are calculated exactly as before 
in Table 4. 
The results prove remarkably robust for the new dependent variables. The 
exporter productivity premia on the full sample, in Table 8, remain positive and 
significantly different from zero for all countries if we use value added per worker 
instead of sales per worker. The magnitudes of the effects are uniformly smaller, and 
the declines range from a factor of seven for Belgium to less than 10% decline for 
Colombia. Using TFP as dependent variable, some coefficients become insignificant 
and some of the OLS estimates even turn negative. The preferred fixed effects 
results remain positive in each case and significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level in three out of the seven cases. The magnitudes of the export premia are on 
average 40% lower if TFP is used as dependent variable rather than sales per 
worker. 
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[Table 8 near here] 
We repeat the comparisons between export starters and non-starters three 
years before and three years after they enter the export market. Results are reported 
in ISGEP (2007). On one hand, concerning the selection hypothesis, the pattern is 
very similar to results reported in Table 6. Most coefficient estimates remain positive 
using VA/L as dependent variable, but their size and significance are lower. The 
same is true for Belgium, China, and Italy if we use TFP as dependent variable, but 
for Colombia, France, and the U.K., negative effects dominate. These results suggest 
that firms invest in new capital equipment prior to entering the export market, 
mirroring results for African firms in Van Biesebroeck (2005). In some cases, this 
explains the entire labour productivity effect. On the other hand, concerning the 
learning-by-exporting question, results using VA/L or TFP as dependent variables are 
very similar to those reported in Table 7 using sales per worker.  
The second robustness check refers to the use of information on units with 10 
or more employees. In order to ensure comparability across countries the main 
results had to be restricted to units – firms or establishments – with 20 and more 
employees. For those countries with a small average unit size this means that up to 
50% of their firm population is outside the analysis. A full set of results is included in 
Appendix III of ISGEP (2007). Two main conclusions emerge from the evidence 
reported. First, the results for exporter productivity premia measured by export status 
indicate that exporters have significantly higher labour productivity than non-
exporters. The size of the overall coefficient from the fixed effect regression is slightly 
larger for almost all countries when compared to the results for units with 20 or more 
employees. Second, where the ex-ante exporter productivity premium was estimated 
to be positive and significant in the sample with 20 or more employees, this is 
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confirmed by larger and more precise estimates for nearly all cases in the samples 
with 10 or more employees  
 
6. Explaining differences in export premia  
Our estimation of exporter premia across 14 countries in Table 3 using 
comparable methods allows us to address the following central question: what 
country characteristics help explain the differences in exporter premia across 
countries? Gravity models of international trade as well as recent theories of 
heterogeneous firms and trade (see Helpman, 2006 and Greenaway and Kneller 
2007 for review articles) help us in selecting a set of theoretically motivated variables 
that may be correlated with higher exporter premia across countries to include in the 
meta-regression analysis described below. 
The main argument in the models of heterogeneous firms and trade is that 
fixed and variable costs of exporting ensure that only those firms with a productivity 
level above a critical threshold find it profitable to export in equilibrium (Melitz, 2003). 
Consider for example fixed entry costs to export markets that differ across industries 
and trade costs that increase with distance introducing differences in variable costs 
of exporting across market destinations. This heterogeneity will reflect itself in 
different unobservable export productivity cut-offs (which determine the productivity 
level above which a firm decides to export) across active firms in the export market. 
The models will predict that as the productivity cut-offs of exporting increase, certain 
firms no longer find it profitable to serve export markets. Thus, firm participation in 
export markets is negatively associated with the level of export productivity cut-offs. 
 Our exporter premia were estimated across countries with firm level 
information. Although these estimates incorporate a high degree of aggregation 
across different export destination markets and industries, they should still reflect the 
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underlying factors (fixed costs of exporting and export productivity cut-offs) 
determining firm export participation. Therefore, we would expect that the higher is 
the critical level of productivity to enter the export market, the higher is the premium 
of exporting firms relative to firms that do not enter the export market. In other words, 
in what follows we will consider that the estimated exporter premium in each country 
can be viewed as a proxy for the unobservable export productivity cut-off driving the 
decision of firms in that country to enter or not the export market. 
The theoretical models of heterogeneous firm and trade suggest that one 
should expect a negative relationship between export participation and exporter 
premia across countries. The reason is that in countries where trade costs are lower 
more firms will be able to enter the export market, not just those at the very top of the 
productivity distribution.The relationship between export participation and exporter 
premia is illustrated in Figure 1. The scatter plot reveals a negative relationship and 
the fitted regression line shows a negative and significant coefficient that is 
consistent with the predictions.  
[Figure 1 near here] 
Thus, one of the variables to include in our econometric analysis is export 
participation measured by the share of firms participating in export markets in each of 
the samples used to estimate the exporter premia. As an alternative, we also 
consider the average export intensity for firms participating in export markets in each 
of the samples used to estimate the exporter premia.  
In these models, higher transport costs faced by exporters would increase the 
cut-off productivity level required for exporting and thus the exporter premium. 
Unfortunately, we do not have direct measures of transport costs across countries 
but we argue that transport costs increase with distance to the served markets as is 
done in gravity models of bilateral trade. Thus, another variable to include in our 
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econometric analysis is a measure of the distance to a country’s exporting partners 
which is computed as an export value weighted average of the distances between 
each country and all its exporting partners. 
The general trade policy environment of a country may also influence the size 
of the estimated exporter premia. In a country with a more restrictive trade policy 
stance, exporters tend to be discriminated against because they need to pay higher 
tariffs on the imported inputs that they generally use in production. This phenomenon 
of anti-export bias would suggest that firms being able to break into export markets in 
such adverse environments would have to really stand out relative to the other firms 
and thus a very large exporter premium could be expected.The Melitz (2003) model 
shows that as a country liberalizes its trade policy, the productivity cut-off level for 
exporting declines and thus the exporter premium would be lower. The rationale for 
this finding is that trade liberalization lowers export costs and thus makes exporting 
affordable for more firms with lower productivity. Hence, another variable to include in 
our econometric analysis is an average tariff measure to capture the trade policy 
stance in the country. 
Other variable to consider is the GDP per capita of the exporter. Based on 
firm-level data for 5 East Asian countries, Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2002) found that 
the magnitude of the export premia is larger in countries with lower per capita 
income. Their interpretation for this finding is that underdeveloped countries have 
less-integrated markets, which allows non-exporters with low levels of productivity to 
survive. In contrast, in more developed economies domestic markets are more 
integrated, making more difficult for low-productivity non-exporting firms to survive. 
The presence of large number of low-productivity firms in countries with low per 
capita GDP implies that those that are able to afford the costs associated with 
exporting will be much more productive than the average firm. 
 24
Finally, the quality of a country’s regulatory environment and government 
institutions may have a direct impact on the fixed and variable trade costs of firms 
located in that country. Thus, heterogeneous models of firms and trade would 
suggest that exporter premia would be lower in such environments. Our econometric 
analysis considers the indices on the effectiveness of government and on regulatory 
quality calculated by Kaufmann et al. (2007) as proxies for the country’s institutional 
environment.  
Meta-analysis is a tool that can be fruitfully used to summarise, and explain 
variations in results of a number of similar empirical studies concerned with one 
research topic.15 Our meta-regression analysis consists of the estimation of an 
equation of the form: 
(4) export premiumj = βXj + θ S + εj  
where the dependent variable is the exporter premia summarized in Table 4 (the 
complete set of variables used can be found in ISGEP, 2007; Table 3). The 
regressions pool 70 coefficient estimates corresponding to 14 countries times 5 size 
categories.16 X is one of the potential explanatory variables described above (see 
Appendix for the definition of these variables), and S is a vector of two size dummies 
indicating whether the exporter premium was estimated based on a sample of plants 
with less than 49 employees or whether the exporter premium was estimated based 
on a sample of plants with more than 50 employees.17 Note that in order to account 
for potential reverse causality, we include all of the explanatory variables at the 
beginning of the sample period for each country. In some of the specifications we 
expand X to be a vector that includes also variables relating to methodological 
                                                          
15 Görg and Strobl (2001) is a recent example of a meta-analysis in the international economics 
literature. 
16 The size categories are 20 to 49 employees, 50 to 99 employees, 100 to 249 employees, 500 or 
more employees, and all sizes (refer to working paper for details). 
17 The omitted category is the exporter premium estimated based on the full sample. 
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characteristics. We allow the error term to be correlated within but not across 
countries. 
The results for the meta-regression analysis are presented in Tables 9 and 10. 
Panels A and B of Table 9 provide the results based on the coefficients summarized 
in Table 4 that are estimated by firm fixed effects and by OLS, respectively (the 
complete set of variables used can be found in ISGEP, 2007; Table 3). We include 
one of the theoretically-motivated explanatory variables in each regression at a time 
because (i) those variables are highly correlated among themselves18 and (ii) we 
have limited degrees of freedom in the meta-analysis regressions since our sample 
includes only 14 countries. The results in Panel A show that average export 
participation is negatively and significantly correlated with the exporter premium. The 
same type of correlation, though weaker, is obtained for average export intensity. 
Panel A shows that countries with more restrictive trade policies are shown to have 
significantly higher exporter premia. This result can be interpreted in light of the anti-
export bias mentioned above: i.e., in such cases exporters need to really be 
substantially more productive than non-exporters to be able to break into export 
markets. Panel A also shows that the higher is the average distance to the exporting 
partners the higher is the estimated exporter premium, as predicted by theory. Our 
results in Panel A also show that the export premia is inversely related to per capita 
GDP, confirming the results from Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2002). Finally, countries 
with a more effective government and with better regulatory quality also exhibit lower 
exporter premia, as expected since firms in those countries are likely to face lower 
costs to enter export markets. 
[Table 9 near here] 
                                                          
18 For example, the correlation coefficient between average distance to export partners and average 
tariff is 0.57 while the correlation between government effectiveness and average tariff is -0.81, both 
significant at the 1% level.  
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It is useful to show graphically some of the partial correlations between the 
exporter premia based on the coefficients summarized in Table 4 estimated by fixed 
effects based on the full sample and some of the main variables of interest, tariffs, 
distance to the exporting partners and GDP per capita. The figures show clearly the 
positive correlations of the exporter premia with tariffs (Figure 2) and average 
distance to export destinations (Figure 3), and the negative correlation of the exporter 
premia with per capita GDP (Figure 4). However, it is clear that these correlations 
would not hold if we excluded Chile, China and Colombia from the Figures, as the 
remaining EU countries are much more homogeneous in tariffs, distance to exporting 
partners and GDP per capita.  
[Figure 2, 3 and 4 near here] 
The results in Panel B of Table 9 show that none of the theoretically-motivated 
variables are significantly correlated with the exporter premia. Moreover, for some of 
the variables, such as average export participation and average export intensity, the 
sign of the estimated coefficient is opposite of that found in Panel A and is against 
the theoretical predictions. A possible reason for this disparity could be that OLS 
estimates are biased in favor of capital-intensive countries. Recall that the dependent 
variable in the regressions to compute the exporter premium is labor productivity. In 
contrast, the fixed effects estimates control for capital and other factors of production 
such as managerial talent, which are roughly fixed at the firm level over the sample 
period. 
Thus, more capital-intensive firms will appear as being more productive using 
OLS estimates, and as more capital-intensive firms are more likely to export, they will 
bias up the estimated exporter premium. Moreover, this bias is expected to be higher 
in EU countries because of the higher degree of capital intensity in their 
manufacturing industries, relative to developing countries. As a matter of fact, this is 
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the case in our sample. The average bias for EU countries is 15%, compared to 9% 
for Chile, China, and Colombia. The exporter premia estimated by OLS in developed 
countries causes the ‘wrong’ signs in our meta-regressions.  
In Table 10, we focus on the coefficients summarized in Table 4 that are 
estimated by firm fixed effects as dependent variables (see ISGEP, 2007, Table 3 for 
a complete presentation of the coefficients used in this estimation). In Panel A, we 
add to each specification the number of observations that was included in the sample 
based on which the exporter premium was estimated. In Panel B, we add to each 
specification a dummy identifying the countries whose datasets used for the 
estimation of exporter premia are based on firms rather than establishments. The 
important conclusion is that neither of these two variables returns a statistically 
significant coefficient. This finding gives us some confidence that the potential 
differences in datasets across countries do not influence the estimated exporter 
premia. Moreover, the coefficients on the other explanatory variables are generally 
unchanged relative to those in Table 10.  
[Table 10 near here] 
 
7. Concluding remarks  
The overall results from our study that uses comparable micro level panel data 
for 14 countries to look at the relationships between exports and productivity using 
identically specified empirical models are in line with the big picture that is by now 
familiar from the literature: Exporters are more productive than non-exporters when 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, and these exporter 
productivity premia tend to increase with the share of exports in total sales. 
Furthermore, we find evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis for the less 
developed countries in our sample, and for all EU-countries with data sets including a 
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large enough number of export starters to investigate this issue. On the other hand, 
we find evidence in favour of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis for one (Italy) of 
out of 14 countries. 
These results are in line with those reported for many countries in the review 
article by Wagner (2007). However, the paucity of evidence on learning-by-exporting 
found on this paper should be qualified, as it might be dependent on the specific 
methodology utilized.   For instance, a number of recent works find positive effect of 
export experience on productivity using more sophisticated estimation techniques 
and controlling for the bias caused by the self-selection of the most productive plants 
into exporting (see e.g. Van Biesebrock, 2006; Isgut and Fernandes, 2007; Lileeva 
and Trefler, 2007; and De Loecker, 2007).  Moreover, the positive results on Italy are 
robust to the use of more sophisticated techniques such as propensity score 
matching and difference-in-differences (Serti and Tomasi, 2007).  More research is 
needed on this area. 
Section 5 presents some robustness checks. First, we check the robustness of 
our results with respect to different measures of productivity. The results prove 
remarkably robust for value added per worker and TFP. The magnitudes of the 
exporter premia are lower if value added and TFP are used as measures of 
productivity rather than sales per worker. Independently of the measure of 
productivity being used, the evidence obtained in favour of the self-selection and the 
learning-by-exporting hypotheses is very similar,. Second, an additional robustness 
check that has been performed refers to the effect of including firms having at least 
10 employees. Enlarging the sample of firms confirms the basic results obtained with 
the sample of units with at least 20 employees and, in general terms, produces larger 
and more precise estimates of current and ex-ante exporter productivity premia.     
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The average exporter premium estimated for the 14 countries, after controlling 
for fixed effects, is 7 percent. This premium varies a lot across countries. The large 
number of countries and the high degree of comparability of our results allow us to 
address a central question: what country characteristics help explain the differences 
in exporter premia across countries? We perform a meta-analysis to explain such a 
variation in cross-country productivity premia of exporters. Building on gravity models 
of international trade, as well as on recent theories of trade with heterogeneous firms, 
we explore the relationship between a set of country characteristics and the cross-
country variation on exporters’ premia. Consistently with theoretical predictions, we 
find that productivity premia are larger in countries with lower export participation 
rates, with more restrictive trade policies, lower per capita GDP, less effective 
government and worse regulatory quality, and in countries exporting to relatively 
more distant markets on average. 
This paper primarily focuses on the export and productivity link. This narrow 
focus allows us to use more robust estimation methods and achieve greater 
international comparability. Exploiting the large number of countries and the high 
degree of comparability, we examine determinants of exporter premia suggested by 
recent theories of trade with heterogeneous firms. We are able to identify a 
systematic relationship between some country characteristics and the cross-country 
variation of exporter premia. A solid understanding of the nature and the causes of 
this relationship across countries is a pre-requisite for any sound policy-oriented 
arguments that might help to foster export-driven growth.         
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Figure 1 
Exporter premia and export participation 
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Figure 2 
Exporter premia and tariffs  
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Figure 3 
Exporter premia and distance 
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Figure 4 
Exporter premia and GDP per capita 
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Table 1: Countries included in the international comparison and data sets used
Country Coverage Years
Austria Manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees 1999 – 2005
Belgium          All firms 1996 – 2005
Chile          All establishments with at least 10 workers 1990 – 1999
China All state firms and all non-state firms with sales above RMB 5 million 1998 – 2005
Colombia All establishments with at least 10 workers. 1981 – 1991
Denmark Universe of firms with minimum economic activity 1999 – 2002
France All firms with at least 20 active persons 1990 – 2004
Germany All establishments with at least 20 active persons (including owners) plus 
smaller establishments that are part of a multi-establishment enterprise with 
at least 20 active persons
1995 – 2004
Italy Universe of firms with 20 or more workers 1989 – 1997
Republic of 
Ireland
Census of industrial production. It includes all establishments with with 3 or 
more employees in NACE Rev 1.1 manufacturing sectors 10-41. 
Establishments are not necessarily dropped if they fall below 3 employees.
1991 – 2004
Slovenia All establishments, including firms with less than 10 employees 1994 – 2002
Spain All firms with more than 200 employees plus a sample of firms employing 
between 10 and 200 employees selected according to a stratified random 
sampling procedure.
1990 – 1999
Sweden All firms 1997 – 2004
United 
Kingdom
All firms operating in the UK; over representation of large firms because of 
missing value problems
1995 – 2004
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Table 2 Exporter participation rate, export intensity and share of exports for top exporters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country/year Participation rate 
Export 
intensity 
Share of exports 
Top one 
percent 
Top 5 
percent 
Top 10 
percent 
Austria (2005) 71.4 44.1 30.9 63.0 75.3 
Belgiun (2005) 80.3 44.3 43.3 69.9 78.9 
Chile (1999) 30.9 27.4 24.8 54.7 70.7 
China (2005) 30.4 60.3 42.6 63.2 70.7 
Colombia (1991) 26.6 17.8 27.9 66.2 79.2 
Denmark (2002) 77.2 30.5 - - - 
France (2004) 74.8 23.8 48 84 98 
West Germany (2004) 69.3 29.6 51.6 72.7 82.4 
East Germany (2004) 50.9 24.3 44.4 69.5 80.7 
Italy (1997) 69.3 33.1 43.6 67.7 77.2 
Rep. of Ireland (2004) 69.5 53.1 78 94 98 
Slovenia (2002) 81.3 54.7 43.4 75.7 85.6 
Spain (1999) 74.7 30.8 49.9 70.9 79.2 
Sweden (2004) 83.0 44.0 53.7 75.3 84.2 
UK (2004) 69.5 32.1 53.3 73.8 81.4 
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Table 3: Export participation, export intensity, firm size and country characteristics  
 
 Export participation Export intensity 
Dummy size=50-249        1.0723      0.2876 
 (0.1663)*** (0.1291)** 
Dummy Size=250-499        1.9708      0.3803 
 (0.1878)*** (0.1847)** 
Dummy Size=+500         2.3726     0.6290 
 (0.2122)*** (0.1547)*** 
Dummy end of period        -0.0812      -0.0706 
 (0.1352) (0.1311) 
GDP        -0.0003    -0.0004 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
GDP per capita        0.0001     0.0001 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Dummy establishment level data         0.3026    -0.6186 
 (0.1468)** (0.1446)*** 
Dummy China -     3.7659 
 -  (0.4444)*** 
Constant       -1.4450    -1.5684 
 (0.2851)*** (0.2530)*** 
Observations 120 120 
R-squared 0.76 0.45 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
 
 
  
 39
Table 4: Exporter productivity premia (percentage) I: Exporter dummy 
 
Country (years) Pooled  
β 
(p-value) 
Fixed effects 
β 
(p-value) 
Number of 
observations 
(NxT) 
Austria (1999-2005) 17.5 (0.00) 
5.3 
(0.00) 
26,404 
 
Belgium (1996-2005) 57.8 (0.00) 
9.8 
(0.00) 
29,035 
Chile (1990-1999) 21.7 (0.00) 
7.3 
(0.00) 
33,869 
 
China (1998-2005) 15.7 (0.00) 
10.9 
(0.00) 
1,310,771 
 
Colombia (1981-1991) 26.9 (0.00) 
16.4 
(0.00) 
46,142 
 
Denmark (1999-2002) 38.5 (0.00) 
6.6 
(0.00) 
29,161 
 
France (1990-2004) 20.0 (0.00) 
7.6 
(0.00) 
297,393 
 
West Germany (1995-2004) 15.4 (0.00) 
7.2 
(0.00) 
311,625 
 
East Germany (1995-2004) 14.3 (0.00) 
5.6 
(0.00) 
61,140 
 
Italy (1989-1997) 40.3 (0.00) 
3.6 
(0.00) 
175,032 
 
Rep. of Ireland (1991-2004) 14.6 (0.00) 
7.3 
(0.00) 
27,232 
 
Slovenia (1994-2002) 9.6 (0.00) 
5.0 
(0.00) 
9,909 
 
Spain (1990-1999) 27.5 (0.00) 
8.1 
(0.00) 
12,806 
 
Sweden (1997-2004) 6.7 (0.00) 
-0.1 
(0.85) 
31,838 
 
UK (1995-2004) 9.9 (0.00) 
3.9 
(0.00) 
52,593 
 
 
Notes: Results are for firms from ISIC industries 15 – 36 with at least 20 employees at the median over the years 
covered in the panel. The firms with the bottom/top one percent of labor productivity (defined as total sales per 
employee) in a year are excluded from all computations. ß is the estimated regression coefficient from an OLS-
regression of log (labor productivity) on a dummy variable for exporting firms, controlling for the log of the number 
of employees and its squared value, the log of wages and salaries per employee, and a full set of interaction 
terms of 4digit industry-dummies and year dummies; the fixed effects model adds firm fixed effects. To facilitate 
interpretation the estimated coefficients for the exporter dummy variable have been transformed by 100(exp(ß)-1). 
p is the prob-value. NxT is the number of observations. 
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Table 5: Exporter productivity premia II: Share of exports in total sales (β1) 
 and its squared value (β2) 
 
 
Country (years) Pooled Fixed effects 
β1 
(p-value) 
β2 
(p-value) 
β1 
(p-value) 
β2 
(p-value) 
Austria (1999-2005) 0.579 
(0.00) 
-0.295 
(0.00) 
0.229 
(0.00) 
0.117 
(0.06) 
Belgium (1996-2005) 1.397 
(0.00) 
-1.000 
(0.00) 
0.576 
(0.00) 
-0.365 
(0.00) 
Chile (1990-1999) 0.882 
(0.00) 
-0.911 
(0.00) 
0.329 
(0.00) 
-0.223 
(0.001) 
China (1998-2005) 0.912 
(0.00) 
-0.914 
(0.00) 
0.436 
(0.00) 
-0.432 
(0.00) 
Colombia (1981-1991) 0.540 
(0.00) 
-0.122 
(0.002) 
0.620 
(0.00) 
-0.081 
(0.00) 
Denmark (1999-2002) 0.97 
(0.00) 
-0.64 
(0.00) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
-0.35 
(0.00) 
France (1990-2004) 0.734 
(0.00) 
-0.565 
(0.00) 
0.331 
(0.00) 
-0.120 
(0.00) 
West Germany (1995-2004) 0.006 
(0.00) 
-0.00004 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.000002 
(0.30) 
East Germany (1995-2004) 0.007 
(0.00) 
-0.00006 
(0.00) 
0.0031 
(0.00) 
0.0000007 
(0.20) 
Italy (1989-1997) 0.927 
(0.00) 
-0.552 
(0.00) 
0.090 
(0.00) 
0.036 
(0.05) 
Rep. of Ireland (1991-2004) 0.097 
(0.01) 
0.134 
(0.00) 
0.220 
(0.00) 
0.011 
(0.82) 
Slovenia (1994-2002) 0.052 
(0.83) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.009 
(0.34) 
-0.00004 
(0.07) 
Spain (1990-1999) 0.430 
(0.00) 
-0.283 
(0.003) 
0.354 
(0.00) 
-0.179 
(0.00) 
Sweden (1997-2004) 0.151 
(0.00) 
-0.016 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.38) 
UK (1995-2004) 0.025 
(0.37) 
0.034 
(0.33) 
-0.015 
(0.71) 
0.090 
(0.05) 
 
Note: Results are for firms from ISIC industries 15 – 36 with at least 20 employees at the median over the years 
covered in the panel. The firms with the bottom / top one percent of labour productivity (defined as total sales per 
employee) in a year are excluded from all computations. ß1 and ß2 are the estimated regression coefficients from 
an OLS-regression of log (labour productivity) on the share of exports in total sales and its squared value, 
respectively, controlling for the log of the number of employees and its squared value, the log of wages and 
salaries per employee, and a full set of interaction terms of 4-digit industry-dummies and year dummies; the fixed 
effects model adds firm fixed effects. p is the prob-value. 
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Table 6: Productivity premia of export starters vs. non-starters three years before the start: 
Summary of results from equation (2) 
 
 
Country 
[1] 
Median 
No. of 
starters 
per 
year  
[2] 
Median of  
(No. of 
Starters / 
Total No. 
Observations)
[3] 
No. of 
regressions
[4] 
No. of β 
coefficients 
significant 
at the 5% 
level 
[5] 
No. of β 
coefficients  
significant at 
the 10% 
level 
[6] 
Pre-entry 
productivity 
premia 
(median of 
estimated 
β) 
Austria 39 5% 4 1 1 0.08 
Belgium 32 11% 7 1 1 6.07 
Chile 47 3% 7 3 4 12.05 
China 2,254 4% 5 5 5 20.83 
Colombia 107 4% 8 4 4 15.85 
France 300 11% 12 10 10 7.51 
West Germany 338 4% 7 2 3 4.73 
East Germany 118 5% 7 1 1 5.60 
Italy 255 11% 6 6 6 17.44 
Republic of Ireland 23 7% 11 0 1 16.08 
Slovenia 15 16% 6 1 1 -1.24 
Spain 26 13% 7 0 4 24.07 
Sweden 41 1% 5 0 0 -1.24 
UK 33 4% 7 1 1 10.91 
Total   99 35 42  
Note:  Results are for firms from ISIC industries 15 – 36 with at least 20 employees at the median over the years covered in the 
panel. The firms with the bottom / top one percent of labour productivity (defined as total sales per employee) in a year are 
excluded from all computations. The labour productivity premia are estimated in an OLS-regression of log (productivity) on a 
dummy variable for export starters controlling for the log of number of employees and its squared value, log wages and salaries 
per employee, and dummy variables for 4-digit-industries, all measured before the start. This table summarises the results. 
Column [6] reports the median of the estimated coefficients for each country (to facilitate interpretation the estimated coefficients 
for the exporter dummy variable have been transformed by 100(exp(ß)-1)). Column [3] reports the number of regressions 
performed for each country which is equal to the number of cohorts of exporter starters with information available. Columns [4] 
and [5] report the number of coefficients significant at the 5% and 10% level when the ß coefficient is, as expected,  positive.   
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Table 7: Productivity growth differences between export starters and non-starters three years 
after the start: Summary of results from equation (3) 
 
 
Country 
[1] 
Median 
No. of 
starters 
per year  
[2] 
Median (No. 
of Starters / 
Total No. 
Observations)
[3] 
No. of 
regressions
[4] 
No. of β 
coefficients 
significant at 
the 5% level 
[5] 
No. of β 
coefficients  
significant at 
the 10% 
level 
[6] 
Productivity 
growth  
premia 
(median of 
estimated 
β) 
Austria 16 3% 1 0 0 0.06 
Belgium 11 7% 4 1 2 19.26 
Chile 42 3% 4 0 0 1.89 
China 538 2% 2 0 0 -4.51 
Colombia 36 2% 5 0 0 -0.06 
France 173 12% 9 0 0 -0.22 
West Germany 187 3% 4 0 0 -0.04 
East Germany  61 3% 4 1 1 -2.23 
Italy 144 11% 3 2 3 4.32 
Republic of Ireland  18 8% 8 1 1 -1.35 
Slovenia  4 9% 3 0 0 6.17 
Spain  16 11% 4 0 0 5.19 
Sweden 52 2% 2 0 0 2.13 
UK 19 5% 4 1 1 3.9 
Total   56 6 8  
Note:  Results are for firms from ISIC industries 15 – 36 with at least 20 employees at the median over the years covered in the 
panel. The firms with the bottom / top one percent of labour productivity (defined as total sales per employee) in a year are 
excluded from all computations. The labour productivity premia are estimated in an OLS-regression of the growth rate of labour 
productivity (computed as the difference of the log of labour productivity in t+3 and t+1) on a dummy variable for export starters 
controlling for the log of number of employees and its squared value, log wages and salaries per employee, and dummy 
variables for 4-digit-industries, all measured at the start year t. This table summarises the results. Column [6] reports the median 
of the estimated coefficients for each country (to facilitate interpretation the estimated coefficients for the exporter dummy 
variable have been transformed by 100(exp(ß)-1)). Column [3] reports the number of regressions performed for each country 
which is equal to the number of cohorts of exporter starters with information available. Columns [4] and [5] report the number of 
coefficients significant at the 5% and 10% level when the ß coefficient is, as expected, positive.    
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Table 8: Exporter premia with different measures of productivity 
 
  Sales / workers  VA / workers  TFP   Number of  
Country Pooled β Fixed effects β  Pooled β Fixed effects β  Pooled β Fixed effects β  observations 
(years) (p-value) (p-value)  (p-value) (p-value)  (p-value) (p-value)  (NxT) 
Belgium 60.8 9.9  9.0 1.4  0.7 3.6  26,092 
 (1996-2005) [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.04]  [0.36] [0.06]   
           
China 11.7 8.8  1.3 6.6  -2.4 5.2  1,138,350 
(1998-2005) [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]   
           
Colombia 23.66 12.86  23.65 11.74  1.92 9.53  44,425 
(1981-1991) [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]   
           
France 19.8 7.4  5.0 2.6  1.9 2.1  293,196 
(1990-2004) [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]   
           
Rep. of Ireland 13.68 6.80  8.77 4.14  - -  26,472 
(1991-2004) [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]      
           
Italy 38.4 3.2  10.1 0.74  5.6 0.33  169,778 
(1989-1997) [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.10]   
           
Slovenia 25.6 4.3  9.6 5.0  -1.5 2.9  9,807 
(1994-2002) [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.32] [0.22]   
           
UK 10.4 5.5  5.3 2.0  -0.6 0.4  44,475 
(1995-2004) [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.37] [0.68]     
 
Note: Results are for firms from ISIC industries 15 – 36  with at least 20 employees at the median over the years covered in the 
panel. The firms with the bottom / top one percent of productivity in a year are excluded from all computations. ß is the 
estimated regression coefficient from an OLS-regression of log (productivity) on a dummy variable for exporting firms, 
controlling for the log of the number of employees and its squared value, the log of wages and salaries per employee, and a full 
set of interaction terms of 4digit industry-dummies and year dummies; the fixed effects model adds firm fixed effects. To 
facilitate interpretation the estimated coefficients for the exporter dummy variable has been transformed by 100(exp(ß)-1). p is 
the prob-value. N ist the number of firms, NxT is the number of observations. 
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Table 9. Determinants of exporter premia I 
 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Export Premia Estimated by Fixed Effects       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Average Export Participation -0.099***             
  (0.025)             
Average Export Intensity   -0.060           
    (0.049)           
Average Tariff     0.431***         
      (0.111)         
Log of Distance to Exporting Partners       3.286***       
        (0.875)       
Log of per Capita GDP         -2.111***     
          (0.585)     
Regulatory Quality           -2.882**   
            (1.026)   
Government Effectiveness             -2.647*
              (1.263)
Dummy for 20-49 Employees Sample -1.4135** -0.363 -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 
  (0.524) (0.501) (0.471) (0.471) (0.471) (0.471) (0.471)
Dummy for Other Size Samples 2.267** 0.985 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652 
  (0.793) (0.949) (0.959) (0.959) (0.959) (0.959) (0.959)
Number of Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
R-Squared 0.17 0.04 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.11 
                
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Export Premia  Estimated by OLS         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Average Export Participation 0.034             
  (0.123)             
Average Export Intensity   -0.021           
    (0.104)           
Average Tariff     -0.258         
      (0.507)         
Log of Distance to Exporting Partners       -1.696       
        (4.853)       
Log of per Capita GDP         0.834     
          (1.942)     
Regulatory Quality           -0.133   
            (2.978)   
Government Effectiveness             -0.201 
              (4.128)
Dummy for 20-49 Employees Sample 1.875 1.406 1.464 1.464 1.464 1.4643 1.464 
  (1.555) (1.026) (0.964) (0.964) (0.964) (0.964) (0.964)
Dummy for 50 or More Employees Samples -4.032 -3.367 -3.486* -3.486* -3.486* -3.486* -3.486*
  (3.108) (2.025) (1.908) (1.908) (1.908) (1.908) (1.908)
Number of Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
R-Squared 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
confidence levels, respectively.  The dummy for other size samples is equal to 1 for 20-49 employees sample, for 50-249 
employees sample, for 250-499 employees sample, and for more than 500 employees sample. 
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Table 10. Determinants of exporter premia II. 
 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Export Premia Estimated by Fixed Effects Adding Number of Observations in Export Premia 
Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Average Export Participation -0.094***             
  (0.030)             
Average Export Intensity   -0.058           
    (0.042)           
Average Tariff     0.409***         
      (0.131)         
Log of Distance to Exporting Partners       3.045***       
        (0.929)       
Log of per Capita GDP         -2.008**     
          (0.747)     
Regulatory Quality           -2.733*   
            (1.356)   
Government Effectiveness             -2.404 
              (1.471) 
Dummy for 20-49 Employees Sample -1.161* 0.196 0.141 0.070 -0.019 -0.086 0.051 
  (0.578) (0.634) (0.568) (0.435) (0.526) (0.532) (0.511) 
Dummy for Other Size Samples 2.667** 2.362** 1.503 1.327 1.105 0.936 1.279 
  (0.985) (1.052) (1.223) (1.225) (1.413) (1.420) (1.216) 
Number of Observations in Export Premia Sample 0.220 0.635 0.390 0.309 0.208 0.130 0.287  
  (0.372) (0.451) (0.472) (0.327) (0.508) (0.527) (0.451) 
Number of Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
R-Squared 0.17 0.07 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.11 
                
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Export Premia Estimated by Fixed Effects Adding Dummy for Datasets Based on Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Average Export Participation -0.091***             
  (0.026)             
Average Export Intensity   -0.064           
    (0.054)           
Average Tariff     0.409***         
      (0.111)         
Log of Distance to Exporting Partners       2.984**       
        (1.044)       
Log of per Capita GDP         -1.938***     
          (0.451)     
Regulatory Quality           -2.795***   
            (0.812)   
Government Effectiveness             -2.299 
              (1.335) 
Dummy for 20-49 Employees Sample -1.3157** -0.375 -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 
  (0.521) (0.519) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) 
Dummy for 50 or More Employees Samples 2.1365** 1.008 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652 
  (0.734) (0.954) (0.966) (0.966) (0.966) (0.966) (0.966) 
Dummy for Datasets Based on Firms -1.396 -2.624 -0.543 -1.716 -1.384 -2.327 -1.526 
  (1.365) (1.701) (1.825) (1.527) (1.621) (1.727) (1.915) 
Number of Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
R-Squared 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.12 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
confidence levels, respectively.  The dummy for other size samples is equal to 1 for 20-49 employees sample, for 50-249 
employees sample, for 250-499 employees sample, and for more than 500 employees sample. 
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Appendix:  Variables Used in Meta-Analysis Regressions 
The exogenous variables considered in the meta-analysis regressions – whose 
dependent variable is the export premia reported in Table 3 of ISGEP (2007) - are 
defined as follows: 
1) Dummy for 20-49 Employees Sample: dummy variable indicating that the export 
premium is obtained for a sub-sample of firms in the size class 20-49 employees. 
[Source: Table 3 of ISGEP, 2007] 
2) Dummy for Other Size Samples: dummy variable indicating that the export 
premium is obtained for a sub-sample of firms in one of the following three size 
classes: 50-249 workers, or 250-499 workers, or more than 500 workers. [Source: 
Table 3 of ISGEP, 2007] 
3) Average Export Participation: Number of exporters over number of firms during the 
first year in the sample. [Source: Table 2 of ISGEP, 2007] 
4) Average Export Intensity: Average share of exports in firm sales for exporters 
during the first year in the sample. [Source: Table 2 of ISGEP, 2007] 
5) Average Tariff: effectively applied tariff rate in the initial year (or the first available 
year closer to that initial year) of each country’s sample period [Source: WITS 
database]. 
6) Log of Distance to Exporting Partners: Weighted average distance between 
exporter and export destination countries using the share of the value of exports to 
each country as weights. [Source: CEPII website and WITS database]. 
7) Log of Per Capita GDP: log of per capita GDP at Purchasing Power Parity in 
constant 2000 international USD in the initial year of each country’s sample period 
[Source: World Development Indicators database]. 
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8) Regulatory Quality: normally distributed index with mean 0 and standard-deviation 
of 1 (across a total of 207 countries) whose higher values imply a better institutional 
framework. The index measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. [Source: Governance Indicators of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 
2006]. 
9) Government Effectiveness: normally distributed index with mean 0 and standard-
deviation of 1 (across a total of 207 countries) whose higher values imply a better 
institutional framework. The index measures the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and its degree of independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. [Source: Governance Indicators of 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006]. 
10) Number of Observations in Export Premia Sample: total number of observations 
used in the regression that estimated the export premium. [Source: Table 3 of 
ISGEP, 2007] 
11) Dummy for Datasets Based on Firms: dummy variable indicating that the export 
premium was estimated based on a sample whose unit of observation is a firm. 
[Source: Table 1 of ISGEP, 2007] 
General note: the export premia for East Germany are excluded from the sample 
used for the meta-analysis regressions. 
 
